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Abstract—In this paper, we study beamforming in decode-and-
forward (DF) relaying using multiple relays, where the source
node sends a secret message as well as a non-secret message to
the destination node in the presence of multiple non-colluding
eavesdroppers. The non-secret message is transmitted at a fixed
rate R0 and requires no protection from the eavesdroppers,
whereas the secret message needs to be protected from the
eavesdroppers. The source and relays operate under a total power
constraint. We find the optimum source powers and weights of the
relays for both secret and non-secret messages which maximize
the worst case secrecy rate for the secret message as well as meet
the information rate constraint R0 for the non-secret message.
We solve this problem for the cases when (i) perfect channel
state information (CSI) of all links is known, and (ii) only the
statistical CSI of the eavesdroppers links and perfect CSI of other
links are known.
keywords: Cooperative relaying, physical layer security, secret and non-
secret messages, secrecy rate, multiple eavesdroppers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The foundation for secure communication using physical
layer techniques was laid by Wyner in his work in [1], where
the idea of secrecy rate and secrecy capacity for the wire-tap
channel was introduced. The work was later extended to the
broadcast channel and the Gaussian channel in [2] and [3],
respectively. The broadcast nature of wireless transmissions
makes them vulnerable to eavesdropping. Several works on
secure wireless communication using single and multiple
antennas have been reported in the literature, e.g., [4]–[7].
Cooperative relays which act as distributed antennas can be
used to improve the secrecy rate performance. Secrecy rates
under cooperative relaying have been studied, e.g., [11]–[15].
In [2], simultaneous transmission of a private message to
receiver 1 at rate R1 and a common message to both the
receivers at rate R0 for two discrete memoryless channels with
common input was considered. Recently, the work in [2] has
been extended to MIMO broadcast channel with confidential
and common messages in [8]–[10]. Motivated by the above
works, in this paper, we consider communication of secret and
non-secret messages between a source-destination pair, aided
by multiple decode-and-forward (DF) relays, in the presence
of multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers. Both the secret and
non-secret messages are intended for the destination. While the
secret message needs to be protected from the eavesdroppers,
the non-secret message need not be. The non-secret message
is sent at a fixed rate R0. There is a total power constraint on
the source and relays powers. In this setting, our aim is to find
the optimum source powers and relay weights (beamforming
vectors) for the secret and non-secret messages. The objective
is to maximize the worst case secrecy rate for the secret
message and to meet the information rate constraint R0 for
the non-secret message. We solve this problem for two cases
of channel state information (CSI) assumption. In the first case,
perfect CSI of all links is assumed. In the second case, only
the statistical CSI of the eavesdroppers links and perfect CSI
of other links are assumed to be known.
Notations : A ∈ CN1×N2 implies that A is a complex
matrix of dimension N1 × N2. A  0 denotes that A is a
positive semidefinite matrix. Transpose and complex conjugate
transpose operations are denoted by [.]T and [.]∗, respectively.
‖ . ‖ denotes 2-norm operation. E[.] denotes the expectation
operator.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a DF cooperative relaying scheme which consists
of a source node S, N relay nodes {R1, R2, · · · , RN}, an
intended destination node D, and J non-colluding eavesdrop-
per nodes {E1, E2, · · · , EJ}. The system model is shown in
Fig. 1. In addition to the links from relays to destination node
and relays to eavesdropper nodes, we assume direct links from
source to destination node and source to eavesdropper nodes.
The complex fading channel gains between the source to relays
are denoted by γ = [γ1, γ2, · · · , γN ] ∈ C1×N . Likewise, the
channel gains between the relays to destination and the relays
to jth eavesdropper are denoted by α = [α1, α2, · · · , αN ] ∈
C1×N and βj = [β1j , β2j , · · · , βNj] ∈ C1×N , respectively,
where j = 1, 2, · · · , J. The channel gains on the direct
links from the source to destination and the source to jth
eavesdropper are denoted by α0 and β0j , respectively.
Let PT denote the total transmit power budget in the system
(i.e., source power plus relays power). The communication be-
tween source S and destination D happens in two hops. Each
hop is divided into n channel uses. In the first hop of trans-
mission, the source S transmits two independent messages W0
and W1 which are equiprobable over {1, 2, · · · , 22nR0} and
{1, 2, · · · , 22nRs}, respectively. W0 is the non-secret message
to be conveyed to the destination at a fixed information
rate R0 which need not be protected from Ejs. W1 is the
secret message which has to be conveyed to the destination
at some rate Rs with perfect secrecy [7], i.e., W1 needs to
be protected from all Ejs. For each W0 drawn equiprobably
from the set {1, 2, · · · , 22nR0}, the source S maps W0 to
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Fig. 1. DF relay beamforming with secret and non-secret messages.
an iid (∼ CN (0, 1)) codeword X01 , X02 , · · · , X0n of length
n. Similarly, for each W1 drawn equiprobably from the set
{1, 2, · · · , 22nRs}, the source S, using a stochastic encoder,
maps W1 to an iid (∼ CN (0, 1)) codeword X11 , X12 , · · · , X1n
of length n. Let P 0s and P 1s denote the source transmit
powers corresponding to the codewords X01 , X02 , · · · , X0n and
X11 , X
1
2 , · · · , X
1
n, respectively. In the kth (1 ≤ k ≤ n) channel
use, the source transmits the sum of the weighted symbols, i.e.,√
P 0sX
0
k+
√
P 1sX
1
k . In the following, we will use X0 and X1
to denote the symbols in the codewords X01 , X02 , · · · , X0n and
X11 , X
1
2 , · · · , X
1
n, respectively.
In the second hop of transmission, relays retransmit the
decoded symbols X0 and X1 to the destination D. Let φ =
[φ1, φ2, · · · , φN ]
T ∈ CN×1 and ψ = [ψ1, ψ2, · · · , ψN ]T ∈
CN×1 denote the complex weights applied by the relays cor-
responding to the transmit symbols X0 and X1, respectively.
The ith (1 ≤ i ≤ N) relay transmits the sum of the weighted
symbols which is φiX0 + ψiX1.
Let yRi , yD1 , and yE1j denote the received signals at the ith
relay, destination D, and jth eavesdropper Ej , respectively, in
the first hop of transmission. In the second hop of transmission,
the received signals at the destination and jth eavesdropper are
denoted by yD2 and yE2j , respectively. We then have
yRi =
√
P 0s γiX
0 +
√
P 1s γiX
1 + ηRi ,
∀i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (1)
yD1 =
√
P 0s α0X
0 +
√
P 1s α0X
1 + ηD1 , (2)
yE1j =
√
P 0s β0jX
0 +
√
P 1s β0jX
1 + ηE1j ,
∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, (3)
yD2 = αφX
0 +αψX1 + ηD2 , (4)
yE2j = βjφX
0 + βjψX
1 + ηE2j ,
∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J. (5)
The noise components, η’s, are assumed to be iid CN (0, N0).
III. BEAMFORMING WITH SECRET AND NON-SECRET
MESSAGES - KNOWN CSI ON ALL LINKS
In this section, we assume perfect knowledge of the CSI
on all links. This assumption can be valid in scenarios where
the eavesdroppers are also legitimate users in the network.
Since the symbol X0 is transmitted at information rate R0
irrespective of X1, treating X1 as noise, relays will be able
to decode X0 if ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
1
2
I
(
X0; yRi
)
=
1
2
log2
(
1 +
P 0s | γi |
2
N0 + P 1s | γi |
2
)
≥ R0, (6)
where (6) is derived using (1) and the factor 1/2 appears
because of the two hops. Similarly, using (2) and (4), the
destination D will be able to decode X0 if
1
2
I
(
X0; yD1 , yD2
)
=
1
2
log2
(
1 +
P 0s | α0 |
2
N0 + P 1s | α0 |
2
+
φ∗α∗αφ
N0 +ψ
∗α∗αψ
)
≥ R0. (7)
Using (1) and with the knowledge of the symbol X0, the
information rate for X1 at the ith relay is
1
2
I
(
X1; yRi |X
0
)
=
1
2
log2
(
1 +
P 1s | γi |
2
N0
)
. (8)
Similarly, using (2) and (4), the information rate for X1 at the
destination D is
1
2
I
(
X1; yD1 , yD2 |X
0
)
=
1
2
log2
(
1 +
P 1s | α0 |
2
N0
+
ψ∗α∗αψ
N0
)
. (9)
Using (3), (5), and assuming the knowledge of X0 at the
eavesdroppers, the information rate for X1 at eavesdropper
Ej is
1
2
I
(
X1; yE1j , yE2j |X
0
)
=
1
2
log2
(
1 +
P 1s | β0j |
2
N0
+
ψ∗β∗jβjψ
N0
)
. (10)
We note that there is no decoding constraint for the symbol
X0 on any eavesdropper Ej similar to (6) and (7). This makes
(10) as the best possible information rate for symbol X1 at
Ej . Further, with the knowledge of symbol X0, the relays will
be able to decode the symbol X1 if ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , N [12,15]
1
2
I
(
X1; yRi |X
0
)
≥
1
2
I
(
X1; yD1 , yD2 |X
0
)
, (11)
i.e.,
1
2
log2
(
1 +
P 1s | γi |
2
N0
)
≥
1
2
log2
(
1 +
P 1s | α0 |
2
N0
+
ψ∗α∗αψ
N0
)
. (12)
The constraint on the total transmit power is
P 0s + P
1
s + φ
∗φ +ψ∗ψ ≤ PT . (13)
Subject to the constraints in (6), (7), (12), and (13), the worst
case achievable secrecy rate for X1 is obtained by solving the
following optimization problem [7,12,15]:
Rs = max
P0s , P
1
s ,
φ, ψ
min
j:1,2,··· ,J
{1
2
I
(
X1; yD1 , yD2 |X
0
)
−
1
2
I
(
X1; yE1j , yE2j |X
0
)}+
, (14)
s.t.
1
2
I
(
X0; yRi
)
≥ R0, ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (15)
1
2
I
(
X0; yD1 , yD2
)
≥ R0, (16)
1
2
I
(
X1; yRi |X
0
)
≥
1
2
I
(
X1; yD1 , yD2 |X
0
)
,
∀i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (17)
P 0s ≥ 0, P
1
s ≥ 0, P
0
s + P
1
s + φ
∗φ +ψ∗ψ ≤ PT , (18)
where {a}+ = max(a, 0), and without loss of generality
we drop this operator since secrecy rate is non-negative. The
constraints (15), (16), and (17) are obtained from (6), (7), and
(12), respectively. The objective function in (14) is obtained
from (9) and (10). We solve the optimization problem in (14)
as follows.
Step1 : Divide the total available transmit power PT in M
discrete steps of size ∆PT = PTM , and let Pm = m∆PT , where
m = 0, 1, 2, · · · ,M − 1.
Step2 : Rewrite the optimization problem (14) as the
following two separate optimization problems; Problem 1 and
Problem 2.
Problem 1:
Rms =
max
P 1s , ψ
min
j:1,2,··· ,J
1
2
{
log2
(
1 +
P 1s | α0 |
2 +ψ∗α∗αψ
N0
)
− log2
(
1 +
P 1s | β0j |
2 +ψ∗β∗jβjψ
N0
)}
, (19)
s.t.
∀i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
1
2
log2
(
1 +
P 1s | γi |
2
N0
)
≥
1
2
log2
(
1 +
P 1s | α0 |
2 +ψ∗α∗αψ
N0
)
,
P 1s ≥ 0, P
1
s +ψ
∗ψ ≤ Pm. (20)
The optimization problem in (19) is a function of P 1s , ψ,
and Pm. For a given Pm, it can be solved using semi-definite
relaxation technique in [15].
Problem 2:
find P 0s , φ, (21)
s.t. ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
1
2
log
2
(
1 +
P 0s | γi |
2
N0 + P 1s | γi |2
)
≥ R0,
1
2
log
2
(
1 +
P 0s | α0 |
2
N0 + P 1s | α0 |2
+
φ∗α∗αφ
N0 +ψ
∗α∗αψ
)
≥ R0,
P
0
s ≥ 0, P
0
s + φ
∗
φ ≤ PT − Pm. (22)
For a given P 1s , ψ, and Pm, it is obvious that the optimum
direction of φ which minimizes the transmit power P 0s +φ
∗φ,
subject to the constraints in (22), lies in the direction of α∗,
i.e., φ =
√
P 0Rφu, where φu =
α∗
‖α∗‖ and P
0
R is the relays
transmit power associated with X0. With this, we rewrite the
feasibility problem in (21) in the following form:
find P 0s , P 0R, (23)
s.t.
(
1 +
P 0s | γi |
2
N0 + P 1s | γi |
2
)
≥ 22R0 , ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
(
1 +
P 0s | α0 |
2
N0 + P 1s | α0 |
2
+
P 0Rφ
∗
uα
∗αφu
N0 +ψ
∗α∗αψ
)
≥ 22R0 ,
P 0s ≥ 0, P
0
R ≥ 0, P
0
s + P
0
R ≤ PT − Pm. (24)
For a given P 1s , ψ, and Pm, the feasibility problem in (23)
with its constraints in (24) is a linear feasibility problem in P 0s
and P 0R, and it can be easily solved using linear programming
techniques.
It can be shown that the secrecy rate Rms which is obtained
by solving the optimization problem (19) for a given Pm is a
strictly increasing function in Pm [15]. Hence, the idea is to
find the maximum power Pm for which P 1s and ψ obtained
by solving (19) also gives a feasible solution P 0s and P 0R in
(23) satisfying the constraints in (24). This can be achieved by
decreasing m from M−1 towards 0 and finding the maximum
m for which the solution of the optimization problem (19)
(i.e., P 1s , ψ) with Pm as available power also gives a feasible
solution for (23) (i.e., P 0s and P 0R satisfying the constraints in
(24)).
A. Suboptimal beamforming with non-secret message for D
and all Ejs
In this subsection, we give a suboptimal beamforming
method with secret and non-secret messages where the secret
message W1 is intended only for D whereas the non-secret
message W0 is intended for D as well as all Ejs. The non-
secret message is transmitted at a fixed rate R0. Similar to (7),
using (3), (5) and treating X1 as noise, Ejs will be able to
decode X0 if ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J,
1
2
I
(
X0; yE1j , yE2j
)
=
1
2
log2
(
1 +
P 0s | β0j |
2
N0 + P 1s | β0j |
2
+
φ∗β∗jβjφ
N0 +ψ
∗β∗jβjψ
)
≥ R0. (25)
With this, the optimization problem in (14) will have additional
constraints (25). Similarly, the feasibility problem (21) will
have the additional constraints (25). For a given P 1s , ψ, and
Pm, the optimum direction of φ which minimizes the transmit
power P 0s + φ
∗φ, can be obtained by solving the following
optimization problem:
min
P 0s , Φ
P 0s + trace(Φ), (26)
s.t. ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , N,(
1 +
P 0s | γi |
2
N0 + P 1s | γi |
2
)
≥ 22R0 ,
(
1 +
P 0s | α0 |
2
N0 + P 1s | α0 |
2
+
αΦα∗
N0 +ψ
∗α∗αψ
)
≥ 22R0 ,
(
1 +
P 0s | β0j |
2
N0 + P 1s | β0j |
2
+
βjΦβ
∗
j
N0 +ψ
∗β∗jβjψ
)
≥ 22R0 ,
∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, Φ  0, rank(Φ) = 1,
P 0s ≥ 0, P
0
s + trace(Φ) ≤ PT − Pm, (27)
where Φ = φφ∗ and the constraints in (27) are written using
all the constraints in (22) and (25). This is a non-convex
optimization problem which is difficult to solve. However, by
relaxing the rank(Φ) = 1 constraint, the above problem can
be solved using semi-definite programming techniques. But,
the solution Φ of the above rank relaxed optimization problem
may not have rank 1. So, we take the largest eigen direction
of Φ as the suboptimal unit norm direction φu. We substitute
φu in the feasibility problem (23) and its constraints (24) and
additional constraints (25). The remaining procedure to find
P 0s , P
1
s , P
0
R and ψ remains same as discussed in Step1 and
Step2.
IV. BEAMFORMING WITH SECRET AND NON-SECRET
MESSAGES – STATISTICAL CSI ON EAVESDROPPERS LINKS
In this section, we obtain the source and relays powers
under the assumption that only the statistical knowledge of
the eavesdroppers CSI is available. The eavesdropper CSI is
assumed to be iid CN (0, σ2β
0j
) for the direct link from source
to Ej and iid CN (0, σ2β
ij
) for the link from relay i to Ej .
With this statistical knowledge of the eavesdroppers CSI, the
optimization problem (19) can be written in the following
form:
Rms =
max
P 1s , ψ
min
j:1,2,··· ,J
1
2
{
log2
(
1 +
P 1s | α0 |
2 +ψ∗α∗αψ
N0
)
−E
[
log2
(
1 +
P 1s | β0j |
2 +ψ∗β∗jβjψ
N0
)]}
(28)
≥
max
P 1s , ψ
min
j:1,2,··· ,J
1
2
{
log2
(
1 +
P 1s | α0 |
2 +ψ∗α∗αψ
N0
)
− log2
(
1 +
P 1s σ
2
β
0j
+ψ∗Λβ
j
ψ
N0
)}
, (29)
s.t. ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
1
2
log2
(
1 +
P 1s | γi |
2
N0
)
≥
1
2
log2
(
1 +
P 1s | α0 |
2 +ψ∗α∗αψ
N0
)
,
P 1s ≥ 0, P
1
s +ψ
∗ψ ≤ Pm, (30)
where the lower bound in (29) is due to Jensen’s in-
equality. The Λβ
j
in (29) is a diagonal matrix with
[σ2β
1j
, σ2β
2j
, · · · , σ2β
Nj
]T on its diagonal. For a given Pm, the
optimization problem (29) can be solved using semi-definite
relaxation. The optimal P 0s , P 1s , P 0R, and ψ can be obtained by
solving the optimization problems (29) and (23) as discussed
in Section-III.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
We present the numerical results and discussions in this
section. We obtained the secrecy rate results through sim-
ulations for N = 2 relays and J = 1, 2, 3 eaves-
droppers. The following complex channel gains are taken
in the simulations: α0 = 0.3039 + 0.5128i, β01 =
0.1161 − 0.0915i, β02 = −0.5194 + 0.4268i, β03 =
−0.0900 + 0.4769i, γ = [−1.3136 + 0.3534i, −0.7070 −
1.1305i], α = [0.3241 + 0.4561i, 0.2713 − 0.5850i],
β1 = [−0.6407 + 0.0709i, −0.0562 + 0.5120i], β2 =
[0.1422− 0.6060i, −0.0590− 0.3308i], and β3 = [0.2793−
0.1426i, −0.5092 + 0.2570i]. For the case of statistical CSI
on eavesdroppers links, the following parameters are taken:
σ2β
01
= 0.01, σ2β
02
= 0.04, σ2β
03
= 0.09, σ2β
i1
= 0.25,
σ2β
i2
= 0.36, σ2β
i3
= 0.49, i = 1, 2. The value of M is taken
to be 50.
Perfect CSI on all Links: Figure 2(a) shows the secrecy
rate plots for DF relay beamforming as a function of total
transmit power (PT ) for the case when perfect CSI on all
links is assumed. The secrecy rates are plotted for the cases
of with and without W0 for 2 relays and different number of
eavesdroppers. For the case with W0, the information rate of
the W0 is fixed at R0 = 0.2. We also assume that when W0 is
present, it is intended only for D and it need not be protected
from Ejs. From Fig. 2(a), we observe that, for a given
number of eavesdroppers, the secrecy rate degrades when W0
is present. However, this degradation becomes insignificant
when PT is increased to large values. Also, the secrecy rate
degrades for increasing number of eavesdroppers. Figure 2(b)
shows the Rs vs R0 tradeoff, where Rs is plotted as a function
of R0 for J = 1, 2, 3 at a fixed total power of PT = 6 dB.
It can be seen that as R0 is increased, secrecy rate decreases.
This is because the available transmit power for W1 decreases
as R0 is increased. In Fig. 2(b), we see that the maximum
achievable secrecy rate Rs without W0 (i.e., when R0 = 0),
which we denote by R′s, are 0.58, 0.45 and 0.28 for J = 1, 2, 3
eavesdroppers, respectively. It can be further noted that if
R0 ≤ R′s, then W0 can also be transmitted as a secret message
and the remaining rate R′s − R0 can be used for the secret
message (W1) transmission. In other words, if R0 ≤ R′s, then
it is possible for both W1 and W0 to be sent as secret massage
at a combined secrecy rate R′s. However, if R0 > R′s, then
W0 can not be transmitted as a secret message.
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Fig. 2. Secrecy rate of DF relay beamforming for N = 2, J = 1, 2, 3.
Perfect CSI on all links. (a) secrecy rate vs total power (PT ) with and without
W0, R0 = 0.2; (b) Rs vs R0 for PT = 6 dB.
Statistical CSI on eavesdroppers links: Figures 3(a) and (b)
show the secrecy rate plots for DF relay beamforming for the
case when only the statistical CSI on eavesdroppers links is
assumed to be known. The CSI on the other links are assumed
to be perfectly known. Figure 3(a) shows the secrecy rate
versus PT plots for R0 = 0.2, and Fig. 3(b) shows the secrecy
rate versus R0 plots for PT = 6 dB. Observations similar to
those in the case of perfect CSI on all links are observed in
Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) as well.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated beamforming in DF relaying using multiple
relays, where the source sends a secret message as well as a
non-secret message to the destination node in the presence of
multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers. The source and relays
operate under a total power constraint. We obtained the
optimum source powers and weights of the relays for both
secret and non-secret messages which maximized the worst
case secrecy rate for the secret message as well as met the
information rate constraint R0 for the non-secret message. We
solved this problem for the cases when (i) perfect CSI of
all links was known, and (ii) only the statistical CSI of the
eavesdroppers links and perfect CSI of other links were known.
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